TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA[1]

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ABSTRACT

The overall aim of the research is to examine the history of Terrorism in West Africa, its causes and current manifestations , and the West African response to Terrorism. A proper analysis has been done on terrorism in West African countries including Nigeria and Mali, the two most impacted nations in the sub region. The ECOWAS counterterrorism policy has also been covered in this research along with the issues and difficulties that Nigeria is facing in the political environment throughout the world as well as the variables that influence its capacity to react Furthermore, the Nigerian's response has been investigated to the emergence and threat of Terrorism in West Africa.

BATI AFRİKA'DA TERRORİZM

ÖZET

Araştırmanın genel amacı, Batı Afrika'daki Terörizmin tarihini, nedenlerini ve mevcut tezahürlerini ve Batı Afrika'nın Terörizme tepkisini incelemektir. Alt bölgede en çok etkilenen iki ülke olan Nijerya ve Mali de dahil olmak üzere Batı Afrika ülkelerinde terörizm konusunda uygun bir analiz yapılmıştır. ECOWAS'ın terörle mücadele politikası, Nijerya'nın dünyadaki mevcut siyasi ortamda karşı karşıya olduğu sorunlar ve zorluklar ile tepki verme kapasitesini etkileyen değişkenler ile birlikte bu araştırmada ele alınmıştır.

1. INTRODUCTION

The West African Sahel area has suffered deliberate and systematic terrorist acts threatening the peace and security of the afflicted countries and the region. Terrorists have attacked Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Indeed, Mali suffered more terrorist assaults than any other Western African state; between 1990 and 2014, a total of 725 individuals, including 178 perpetrators, were murdered by approximately 199 terrorist acts in Mali (Africa Dense Forum, 2020). Al-Qaeda has coordinated these assaults across the area in the Islamic Maghreb. In addition, it maintains connections with its affiliates – the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Boko Haram. As a result, there have been some victories, but there are still more terrorist activities to be carried out in the area. Despite this progress, the emergence of Terrorism in the sub-region and its harmful

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influence on peace, security, and development is cause for concern. The frequency and intensity of strikes evidences the increasing sophistication of terrorist organisations in the sub-region in several West African countries in recent years. The 2012 US Terrorism Report indicates that "969 attacks occurred in Africa in 2012, an increase of 12.4 percent over 2011" despite not being broken down by nation (Bekoe, 2018).

This is partly due to an increase in the frequency of attacks by Boko Haram, a Nigerian terrorist group that carried out 137 attacks in 2012 compared to 30 in 2011. Boko Haram carried out 365 terrorist incidents in 2012, killing 132 people. Terrorists and extremists, particularly members of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are becoming more radicalized and migrating south across the Sahel region into Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, exacerbating the situation (Bavdaž, et al., 2020).

The research analyzed critically the danger of terrorism in West Africa and the steps taken by the Sahel countries to tackle the concerns. The precise goals of the research are: To study the history of terror in West Africa, the reasons and its present manifestations, and the reaction of West Africa to counter these attacks.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Boko Haram in Nigeria

While Nigeria has numerous causes of instability, Boko Haram is the country's leading terror-promoting organization. This is emphasized by the organization's kind of actions and the harm it has caused. For instance, the main objective of Boko Haram was the breakup of Nigeria and nothing not Islamic (Agbiboa, 2015). Extreme Islam, which holds that western education, democracy, and morals are tainted and evil, served as their guiding principle. As a consequence of this, the group has worked for the establishment of an Islamic Sharia caliphate in the northeastern part of Nigeria, in direct contravention of the secularity of the country that is enshrined in the nation's constitution. In accordance with the plan, armed assaults on government security officers and public buildings, including as schools, hospitals, and government agencies in the northeast, Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, were the first to be carried out. Atrocities against the homeless have been committed, including the beheading and cremation of individuals, rape and kidnapping, and the deportation of millions of people to adjacent nations domestically and internationally (Agbiboa, 2015; Akanji, 2015).

In Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, there was no electricity for about two years prior to 2016. As a result of the ongoing Boko Haram attacks, elementary, secondary, and tertiary schools in Borno State have also been closed, disrupting educational activity (Agbiboa, 2015; Akanji, 2015). In May of 2014, more than 200 students from the government secondary school in Chibok, Borno State, were abducted during one of these attacks. (Akanji, 2015). Boko Haram seized more than 100 schoolgirls from Dapchi Girls Secondary School, Yibe State, on February 19, 2018. (PM News, 2018). In addition, the Borno State airport was closed for several months, and the only route leading to the state capital was closed, due to Boko Haram (Idris, 2015).Moreover, violence by Boko Haram weakened the traditional northeast institutions by attacking emir palaces (traditional rulers) at different periods and drove several emirs into exile. For example, in 2014, Boko Haram assaulted five emirs in Borno and two in Yobe, who were compelled to go into exile (Idris, 2014). Emir of Gwozas, Muhammad ibn Ibraheim Timta (killed by Boko Haram on his way to Gombe for a burial), Emir of Bama, Keari Ibn Ibrahim El-Kanemi, Emir of Askira, Ibn Muhammad Askirama of Abubakar, Ali Ibn Ibrahim Mamza of Uba, and Ibn Mamza of Uba, were the traditional rulers . The Federal Government of Nigeria declared a 3-month emergency on the three most afflicted States in 2013, Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, but subsequently prolonged it to 6 months to limit Boko Haram's operations. Despite the emergency, which gave the Government the entire might of the military to the afflicted States, terrorism has persisted and intensified as Boko Haram has committed more fatal violent assaults (Akanji, 2016).

In addition, several neighboring nations in Nigeria, notably Niger, Chad, and Cameron, have been subjected to Boko Haram violent assaults. In Cameron, among other places, for example, Boko Haram abducted civilians, foreign tourist, and country-border missionaries in 2015 (AU, 2015a), carried out 60 suicide attacks in the country's remote region in 2017 (Vanguard, 2018a), and killed several individuals, five in Ashigashiya City in February 2018. (Vanguard, 2018b).

In June 2015, Boko Haram launched many attacks in N'djamena, Republic of Chad, and the Gueskerou region of the Diffa province, Republic of Niger. This resulted in numerous casualties, including 20 deaths in the N'djamena region (ECOWAS Info, 2015) and 38 deaths, the majority of whom were women and children (ECOWAS Info, 2015). (ECOWAS, 2015).

The activities of Boko Haram, particularly the mindless mass murder of civilians, the destruction of property, and its aim to dismember Nigeria, compelled the Nigerian government to adopt a counter-terrorism framework that comprised hard (military), soft (non-military), and judicial measures. In addition, Nigeria and other Lake Chad Basin Committee (LCBC) and Benin Republic Member States responded to Boko Haram's transnational and regional terrorism concerns by deploying the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

2.2 Terrorism in Mali

Mali's radical Islamic organizations have a significant connection to terrorism. Although Islam is the majority religion in Mali, four interrelated factors have made it possible for radical Islamic organizations to flourish in the country (Bossuyt, 2016; George, 2012). The first was ongoing poverty and food shortages resulting from insufficient economic management and growing desertification (George, 2012). This resulted in a group of young people who were susceptible to religious manipulation and radicalization for a period of time (Bas, 2009). The second was the internal self-determination of the Tuareg of the Azawad in northern Mali, which began in the 1960s under various names, such as the National Movement for Azawad (MNA), organized and unified in the 1990s and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPA), and continued into the 2000s (Douglas-Bowers, 2013; George, 2012).

In the 1990s, the Tuareg's agitation for local self-determination in the 1960s and 1980s morphed into a violent uprising for the independence of Azawad (Bas, 2009; Bossuyt, 2016; George, 2012), fueled by growing poverty, unemployment, and desertification in the north. Government and rebels have signed a number of peace accords, including the Tamanrasset Peace Agreement (1991) and the National Peace Pact (1992), emphasizing the demilitarization of the region and the remobilization and integration of rebels into Malian military forces (Douglas-Bowers 2013; George, 2012). However, the government's inability to implement the peace agreements led to the 2006 uprising, which lasted until 2012. (Bossuyt, 2016; George, 2012).

The third and fourth causes were the return of the Tuareg, who had served as mercenaries for President Muammar Gaddafi from February to October 2011, and the entry of heavy weapons into northern Mali (Fessy, 2012). Returning Tuareg rebels and extremist Islamists have exploited the nation's fragile socioeconomic conditions to infiltrate its northern region. This exacerbated the uprising in the north, where Tuareg warriors were bolstered by the influx of heavy weapons and help from extremist Islamists, particularly the Islamist group Ansar Dine (Arieff, 2013). Consequently, between January and March of 2012, in particular, the conflict between government forces and Tuareg militants operating under the banner of the MNLA intensified, resulting in the deaths of some Malian troops and the capture by the MNLA of towns such as Aguelhok and Tessalit in the Azawad region (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013).

During the January–March 2012 uprising, the success of the Ansar Dine-backed MNLA was attributed to the Malian military's lack of discipline and the government's corruption and inefficiency (Arieff, 2013; George, 2012). On 22 March 2012, a group of soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo from the National Committee for the Restitution of Democracy and State (CNRDR) ousted the administration of President

Amadou Toumani Touré (Thurston and Lebovich, 2013). However, the coup resulted in a political leadership problem between the government and the military, since it was unknown for several days who was in control of the country's government due to the fact that the coup conspirators were primarily young officers (Arieff 2013). This enabled the MNLA, backed by Ansar Dine, to seize control of the whole northern region of the country by April 5, 2012, seize control of numerous historical and important towns like as Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, and Douentza, and then declare Azawad's independence (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013).

Humanitarian and human rights repercussions of terrorism have attracted the attention of global, regional, and sub-regional multilateral actors/institutions in northern Mali and north-eastern Nigeria, as well as the transnational, regional, and regional nature and effects of terrorism in both nations. The section that follows focuses on how ECOWAS, as an organization, addressed the problems and challenges terrorists confronted in the subregion.

2.3 Main Terrorist Groups

The main one are Boko Haram, Al Qaeda, Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al Dine and Hezbollah.
Boko Haram is one of the most dangerous terrorist group in Nigeria, despite the country's high level of insecurity. The group's actions and the harm they have inflicted are the best examples of this. For instance, the fundamental objectives of Boko Haram include the abolition of the Nigerian state and everything that is not Islamic. In spite of Nigeria's constitution's secularism and under the direction of a radical Islam that rejects democracy, education, and Western ideals as corrupt and corrupted, the group aims to establish an Islamic caliphate in northeastern (Enaifoghe, 2018). Armed attacks were initially made in the northeast, mainly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, on state security personnel and public facilities such schools, clinics, and government buildings.

Most of the victims of Boko Haram's actions have been women and girls; some of them have been kidnapped, raped, forced to marry warlords, sold into prostitution and sexual slavery, used as human shields against attacks by government forces, and even used as bomb shelters.

AQIM, the North African division of al-Qaeda, operates from neighbouring Mali and has approved attacks in the Sahel, notably in Algeria, Libya, Niger, Tunisia, and Mauritania. On March 13, 2016, 3 gunmen linked to AQIM launched the group's first-ever terrorist activity in Ivory Coast, killing 19 individuals on the coastline of Grand Bassam. In March 2016 attack, which was later found to have been planned by Kounta Dallah, originally from Mali, raised questions about the threat posed by AQIM internal recruitment in Côte d'Ivoire (Kohnert, 2022).

Al-Mourabitoun is a powerful terrorist organization that split from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2011 but officially re-joined the group in 2015; Dec. Al-Mourabitoun is led by prominent Algerian bomber Mokhtar Belmokhtar and aims to create an Islamic state in West Africa. Al-Mourabitoun has demanded responsibility for several terrorist outbreaks in the Sahel and a deadly gun and prisoner attack in the Malian state Bamako in November 2015 (Kabosha, 2020). In March 2016, when AQIM launched its attacks on Ivory Coast, Al-Mourabitoun and AQIM publically operated under the same banner.

Ansar al-Dine "(Movement of Defenders of the Faith or AAD)" was created in November 2011 by Malian Tuareg militant Iyad Ag Ghali "(cousin of AQMI leader Hamada Ag Hama)"AAD is a mainly indigenous movement of the Tuareg and Berber Arabs in northern Mali, working closely with AQIM. Together in seeking to implement Sharia law. Many of the members are Tuaregs who fought with Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi and returned to Mali after the fall. Although AAD has no presence in Côte d'Ivoire, its fighters have been exposed to carrying out attacks on the country.

2.4   The Rise of Terrorism in the West African Region

The diversity of ECOWAS member states engenders an intricate collection of environmental risks throughout the region. There are many of the world's poorest nations in this region. The majority of impoverished regions are rural, with agriculture and animal husbandry constituting the primary rural activity. However, their livelihoods rely on other non-agricultural income sources, including migration (Ehigiamusoe & Lean, 2018).

The biophysical patterns of climate, vegetation, soils, and river basins predate these political boundaries and influence livelihoods, such as the movement of people and resources through the region. For instance, commerce in food and cattle between dry and coastal regions is a historical activity (Dibba & Asal, 2022). As rural economies adapt to urban markets and households strive to improve their condition by combining urban and rural livelihoods, the geographical rise of urban poverty is connected to rural livelihood difficulties.

Figure 1: Economic Social Group of West African Countries

The history of West Africa includes both prosperous and devastating periods. While the current situation reflects this history in terms of the strong ties between the peoples of the region, gaps have formed as a result of disparities between English- and French-speaking countries, political and economic developments, and other causes. A discussion of present vulnerability issues will not seek to explain the influence of historical economic, political, and social conditions; yet, we realize that many of the main causes of vulnerability's underlying inequities are deeply rooted (de Montclos, 2018).

Several studies investigated vulnerability concerns in which restricted technological measures, such as technology to boost crop yield or water systems, can promote vulnerability and poverty reduction objectives. We also see opportunities to advance in all areas of development (education, health, economic development, and governance) in order to create opportunities, safety nets, and a more comprehensive set of formal and informal resources and support on which people can rely to face the challenges of environmental variability.

The issues of natural unpredictability in the region are aggravated by environmental deprivation and other stresses, which exacerbates the plight of the populace. Some environmental degradation issues in the region, such as soil deterioration, have been examined in depth over time, while others, such as the sustainability of groundwater supplies, have only recently been investigated in depth.

This paper defines vulnerability as the capacity to experience damage or loss owing to environmental shocks or pressures. This approach considers exposure patterns ,vulnerability, and resilience to determine who may be affected and to what extent (Dahiru Aminu & Raja, 2021). As vulnerability to environmental stress may be exacerbated by other stresses, this study investigates the interconnections between a number of these stresses. Losses for individuals exposed to environmental stresses vary significantly for numerous reasons.

Vulnerability is contingent upon the availability of 'adaptive resources,' or what the sustainable livelihoods approach refers to as 'forms of capital': the human, financial, economic, social, and physical assets that individuals can utilize to cope with the demands of environmental shocks and pressures. As everywhere, environmental stress sensitivity in West Africa depends on subsistence farming practices and options, such as irrigated or rain-fed agriculture, as well as physiological characteristics, such as advanced age, chronic sickness, or disability. People's capacity and access to home, community, market, and government systems and resources that can help them continue to operate and recuperate determines their resistance to stress.

Included in this category are agricultural price support, food price subsidies, and household loans. In West Africa, these systems are changing for a variety of reasons, including government economic policy and political stability. Vulnerability is related to power and entitlement in social connections and the distribution of resources at various organizational levels. Within communities, access or rights to these resources and the capacity to distribute them varies (Dai, 2018). These differences reflect other social patterns of empowerment and marginalization prevalent in West Africa and the majority of countries around the world, such as gender inequality, ethnic disparities, illiteracy, and the extent to which an individual's health and income depend on environmental factors.

In some instances, poverty and vulnerability may reinforce each other, but poverty is distinct from vulnerability. Household vulnerability within a community represents assets, capabilities, and resource access. People in West Africa can supplement their income from family farms with hazardous work, generate charcoal for sale, sell handicrafts, or brew beer. As a result of repeated losses, people are frequently obliged to sell assets such as animals in order to survive. This assistance can be difficult for households to recoup. These losses might cause people to fall from better living conditions to poverty or from temporary to permanent poverty (Coccia, 2018).

2.5 Terrorism: Contemporary Challenge

Since attaining independence, West African nations have been afflicted by a variety of conflicts. From coup d'états shortly after independence through civil conflicts including, among others, regional and ethno-religious tensions. Islamic terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram and ISWAP, with ties to ISIS, al-Qaeda, and others, have reportedly began to target West African states, including Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, and even Senegal, one of the region's most stable countries, especially after the colonial era (Pujol-Mazzini 2018).

Poverty is a significant obstacle to the propagation of terrorism. Burkina Faso, for instance, is one of the poorest countries in Africa. 50% of the population lives below the internationally recognized poverty threshold of $1.90 per day (ADB,Blake2019).

Since the 1960s, ethnic bloodshed and political instability in Mali have contributed significantly to the relatively unfettered activities of AQIM. Violence is escalating primarily between Muslim extremists and Malians. Mali, which has a longer history of rebellion, is not faring any better. Over the past decade, it has been the epicenter of Islamist violence in the Sahel, with jihadists aiding ethnic Tuareg rebels to capture control of much of the north in 2012. In addition to deadly extremist attacks, Mali also faces the threat of separatists, such as Tuareg organizations demanding political autonomy. These obstacles and the bad environmental conditions, such as recurring drought, high population growth, and deteriorating infrastructure, among others, have continued to impede Mali's progress (Arieff 2018).

As a result of the brutal attacks performed by Boko Haram in the north, which include the murder of civilians, the abduction of schoolgirls, and the destruction of private property, the situation is dire. Approximately 2 million people are currently displaced and in desperate need of humanitarian assistance (WHO 2019; Kelly 2019).

3. THEORITICAL FRAMWORK

3.1 Weber concept of terrorism

The three major elements of terrorism are political philosophy, organisational design, and brutality. Terrorism uses violence against the civilian populace to frighten people and spread panic. The organisational and hierarchical structure of terrorism can be better understood using Weber's theories of authority. It can be helpful to understand how terrorist organisations use political ideology to attract new recruits using the sorts of action and ethics. State and politics cannot be sociologically defined in terms of their objectives, according to Weber (2004: 132).

Terrorist organisations' core ideologies are based on the ethic of **conviction;** which Weber calls irrational (Erol Bulut,2019). For terrorist groups, it is crucial to carry out their actions in the name of pretended ideals such as equality, a just and peaceful world, and the rights of all peoples. In this case, as the victims had no motivation to alter the established system, they are accountable for their own deaths. Weber attributes the lack of radicalism in legal politics to the ethic of responsibility. One could consider terrorism to be a form of corrupt or radicalised politics. Members of terrorist organisations are kept from reflecting on their acts by removing any sense of accountability. A crucial component of organisational continuity is the refusal to challenge the justification of actions.

The causes, effects, and organisational structure of terrorism have been the subject of several research. From the standpoint of Weber's ideas of ethics, action, and different sorts of authority, this study sociologically tackled the problem of terrorism in Ivory Coast. The Weber theory will help to understand terrorist organisations actions and behaviour in different standpoint of ethic. The analysis reveals that terrorist organisations frequently have a strong sense of conviction, value-driven behaviour, and charismatic leadership. Terrorist organisations can take a more flexible stance in terms of operations and shield themselves from criticism thanks to the ethic of conviction and value-based action. Because they may avoid the strict bureaucratic framework of governmental control, terrorist groups are better able to enlist new members. Terrorist groups' members can function largely freely through a network of tiny subgroups without a central command due to the organisations' adaptable and scattered organisational structures. The organisational structure and operational level of terrorist organisations cannot usually be explained by rational choice theories. Irrationality and flexibility, particularly in contemporary terrorism, lead to the internationalisation of terrorist organisations. In light of these facts, the battle against terrorism must take into account this adaptable and illogical structure. This is a planet that has discovered its existence outside of reason.

4. METHODOLOGY

Qualitative data from primary and secondary sources are utilized in this research. . This article draws on various sources, including textbooks, journals, papers, and government policy from recognized international organizations. Another important resource examined in the production of this paper is Internet materials and reports from reputable news agencies, which are related to research for the critical evaluation of authors' opinions on the research subject.

5. REPONSES TO TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA

5.1 African Union response

The African Union (AU) has implemented several anti-terrorism frameworks that emphasise collaboration and categorise violent extremism and terrorist acts as crimes. Following the change from the OAU to the AU, these frameworks have been improved and enlarged. The AU Plan of Action on Preventing and Combating Terrorism was adopted at the AU High Level Governmental Meeting on Preventing and Struggle with Terrorism in Africa, which took place in Algeria in September 2003. Its goal is to provide as a firm foundation for member states' pledges to fight terrorism under the 1999 Convention and other international agreements (Fituni, 2021).

The Action Plan includes effective counter-terrorism strategies to deal with Africa's security issues in the areas of law enforcement, border security, countering terrorist financing, and international information exchange. An effort to improve global cooperation is the creation of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). The Centre seeks to assist in achieving the primary goals of the AU in the fight against terrorism. In the fields of research, analysis, information management, and dimensional building, it will carry out a wide range of operations. As a part of the AU Peace and Security Council, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism was created (Fituni, 2021).

The Centre is answerable to the Peace and Security Council because of this structure, which is compliant with the Protocols to the African Union Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. It should be mentioned in this context that the Centre's branch companies are of a unique type. These units consist of national and regional principal, early warning and prevention systems, lists, and equipment. The coordination of these units' diverse duties and responsibilities continues to be a common barrier in the AU's bureaucratic structure. One of the numerous issues with the AU's execution of counterterrorism policies is the issue of bureaucratic control.

Other significant difficulties facing the AU include enhancing the regional structure to address the terrorist threat and improving response coordination. These difficulties include a lack of personnel and financial resources as well as the difficulty for AU member states to muster the required political will on certain topics. Several difficulties were outlined by a panel of the AU Committee of Experts, including the unpredictable nature of member states' commitments; the lack of support resulting from limited experience with supply, human resources, and mission systems; and the lack of growth of the African Backup Force's own capitals, including business resources (Eze & Frimpong, 2021).

5.2 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) response

The spread of terrorism- and insurgency-related conflicts in West Africa has once again brought attention to the necessity of advancing the ECOWAS security agenda. Along with a development agenda, this agenda aims to maintain peace and stability in the area (Jafarzadeh & Shuquan, 2022). A strong security framework is required in order to advance this agenda. The following requirements serve as the foundation for the ECOWAS military vision. In order to achieve a level of autonomy in terms of troops and logistical funding to respond to internal or external local crises or pressures to peace and safety, including terrorism or environmental terrorism, it is important for ECOWAS to identify, establish, organise, and maintain a regional military inclination capability. There are several obstacles to implementation and execution that must be overcome in order to achieve the goals outlined in the vision discussed above. The boundaries of ECOWAS military operations to combat insecurity in West Africa have been set on a legal, institutional, and operational level.

It is hard for regional organisations to intervene without a reliable system to build and maintain armed troops. The ECOWAS Standby Force, according to the researcher, is a vital move that would make it simpler and quicker to mobilise forces to respond to complicated events.

A defined force structure and composition are necessary for the use of a collective standby force for quick deployment to hotspots in West Africa. A specified regional reserve force, well-trained and equipped and ready to deploy when necessary to respond to a crisis or threat to peace and security, is how the "ECOWAS Standby Force: Concept and Structure plan describes its make-up. The main issue is that it is exceedingly challenging for the ECOWAS standby force to deploy a force that is well-trained and equipped to a crisis location. The high level of equipment procurement corruption and the exorbitant expenditures of military training, as recently seen in West Africa, make this argument all strong (Idrissa, 2019).

At the international level, ECOWAS keeps in touch with a number of nations in and outside of Africa as well as development partners including the UN, EU, AU, and World Bank on terrorism and related issues. For instance, ECOWAS and the US government inked a multi-year security and development deal in 2014. A trans-Saharan collaboration is outlined in the agreement in order to support democratic institutions, trade, investment, and other aspects of peace, security, and counterterrorism. The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), both of which were established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1364 and 1623 to strengthen UN member states' ability to prevent acts of terrorism both inside and outside of their borders, respectively, are regional partners of ECOWAS (Goerzig, 2019).

6.   CONCLUSION

To conclude , terrorism's growth is challenging . However it has created a lot of damage in people's lives and deaths , also displaced people from place to place during a long period. West African terrorism isn't new. Literature overstates its roots. Contemporary terrorism has been studied. After Boko Haram's split, some claim that ISWAP poses a greater long-term threat to the Lake Chad Basin. Attacks on civilians have eroded the group's popularity. Local communities have learned over a decade of terrorism that terrorist groups may differ in short-term methods, but long-term they all aim destabilization and conflict escalation. Local officials must recognize the terrorism threat. Declaring Boko haram defeated won't help face the challenge. The reunification of JAS and ISWAP could lead to a significant resurgence by Boko Haram. Regional governments must boost coordination, intelligence sharing, and border control to undermine transnational terrorist support. Security measures alone cannot contain a terrorist danger. To develop their resilience and counter terrorist recruitment, local communities must be empowered. Western African countries can better tackle terrorism with the correct policies, strategies, and host population cooperation. West African states can reduce terrorism by sharing information, cooperating, and harmonizing border security.

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